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The Returns to Microenterprise Support among the  
Ultrapoor: A Field Experiment in Postwar Uganda†
By Christopher Blattman, Eric P. Green, Julian Jamison, M. Christian 
Lehmann, and Jeannie Annan*
We show that extremely poor, war-affected women in northern 
Uganda have high returns to a package of $150 cash, five days of 
business skills training, and ongoing supervision. Sixteen months 
after grants, participants doubled their microenterprise owner-
ship and incomes, mainly from petty trading. We also show these 
ultrapoor have too little social capital, but that group bonds, infor-
mal insurance, and cooperative activities could be induced and had 
positive returns. When the control group received cash and training 
20 months later, we varied supervision, which represented half of the 
program costs. A year later, supervision increased business survival 
but not consumption. (JEL I38, J16, J23, J24, L26, O15, Z13)
The World Bank, the United Nations, and the United States government have made the eradication of extreme poverty by 2030 a central development goal.1 
Since the world’s poor often live in economies with few firms, anti-poverty pro-
grams often try to foster self-employment. This includes farm enterprises such as 
raising livestock for sale, and nonfarm enterprises such as trading or retail. But can 
the extreme poor be expected to start and sustain such microenterprises? And what 
constraints hold them back?
1 “Extreme poverty” refers to earning less than the $1.25 per day international poverty line. See Burt, Hughes, 
and Milante (2014) for a discussion of the goals. 
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Two in five of the world’s extreme poor are projected to live in fragile and 
 conflict-affected states by 2030, yet rigorous evidence on what works in these 
 settings is sparse.2 To help fill this gap, this paper studies a relatively common 
approach to relieving extreme poverty—transfers of human and physical capital— 
but to a postwar population: the most marginalized people living in small villages in 
northern Uganda, following a 20-year war.
A humanitarian organization, the Association of Volunteers in International 
Service (AVSI), identified 1,800 poor people, mostly women, in 120 war-affected 
villages, and tried to help them start very small but sustainable retail and trading 
enterprises. AVSI’s Women’s INncome Generating Support (WINGS) program pro-
vided people grants of $150 (about $375 in purchasing power parity, or PPP, terms), 
along with five days of business skills training and planning, plus ongoing supervi-
sion to help implement the plan. The grant was 30 times larger than the beneficia-
ries’ baseline monthly earnings.
An abundance of evidence argues that the average poor person has high returns 
to capital and is held back in part by poor access to credit and insurance, and that 
capital transfers and insurance products help grow microenterprises and incomes.3 
Most of this evidence, however, comes from people who already have businesses 
or were selected for their business aptitude.4 It’s not clear if it applies to the most 
marginalized and “ultrapoor”—the people with the lowest incomes, no capital, and 
limited social networks—especially after war.5
The WINGS program has parallels to “graduation” style programs delivered 
to hundreds of thousands of ultrapoor households globally. Graduation programs 
give a bundle of temporary income support, livestock, livestock training, access to 
microfinance, supervision, and life-skills education. On balance, these programs 
have been successful: several studies show substantial shifts from casual labor to 
farm self-employment, and 10 to 40 percent increases in household consumption 
or earnings compared to control groups, lasting at least two to four years (Bandiera 
et al. 2013; Banerjee et al. 2015). The WINGS program differed from these other 
ultrapoor programs in several dimensions, however, including: the postwar setting; 
fewer program components; the focus on petty business; and providing cash rather 
than livestock.6 WINGS was also focused on young women.
2 See Burt, Hughes, and Milante (2014) for population projections. For reviews of the evidence see Blattman 
and Miguel (2010) and Puri et al. (2014). 
3 For example, see Udry and Anagol (2006); de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008); Banerjee and Duflo 
(2011); Karlan, Knight, and Udry (2015); Fafchamps et al. (2014); Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez (2014). 
4 For example, Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez (2014) see high returns to a group-based cash transfer in northern 
Uganda. But the program targeted young adults with much higher levels of education and existing business plans 
for relatively high-skill microenterprises. That program also excluded the two most conflict-affected districts, where 
WINGS was implemented. 
5 On the one hand, returns to capital or other inputs could be greater on the extensive margin than the intensive 
one. Indeed there is growing evidence that poor households use cash to start new enterprises and earn high returns, 
although little of this evidence comes from the poorest of the poor (Macours, Premand, and Vakis 2012; Gertler, 
Martinez, and Rubio-Codina 2012; Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez 2014; Bianchi and Bobba 2013). Returns could 
also be high in a newly stable political equilibrium, as neoclassical models of growth predict (Blattman and Miguel 
2010). On the other hand, the ultrapoor could have low returns to capital, for instance because they lack crucial 
inputs such as education or business experience, or because they are vulnerable to expropriation within or outside 
the family. 
6 Many in the aid community fear cash can be seized, wasted, or cause harm. They could be right. Besides 
the lack of other important inputs, extreme poverty has also been associated with cognitive deficits that impede 
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We evaluated WINGS by assigning the targeted people to either receive the pro-
gram immediately or a year-and-a-half later, randomizing at the village level. Given 
the extreme setting, AVSI was reluctant to have a permanent control group—a com-
mon concern in humanitarian settings, and one reason humanitarian evaluations are 
rare. Thus, our design evaluates impacts a few months before the 60 control villages 
entered the program.
We also tested the role of social capital in business success: could social capital 
be fostered, and would it increase the returns to grants? In poor rural villages, social 
networks are a main source of business advice, cooperation, and informal finance.7 
For instance, in microcredit, growing evidence suggests that group lending is help-
ful not because of joint liability, but rather because it builds social capital and pro-
motes risk-pooling.8
To test this, in half of the treatment villages, AVSI returned a couple of months 
after the grants (after individual businesses had already been started) to encour-
age the participants to form self-help groups, and offered three additional days of 
training in working together. The curriculum focused on developing organizational 
structures, decision-making processes, leadership, and helping them form a rotating 
savings and credit association (ROSCA).
Sixteen months after grants, the standard WINGS program (without group 
encouragement) led to large changes in occupation and incomes. Thirty-nine per-
cent of the control group had a nonfarm business, and this rose to 80 percent among 
WINGS participants. Employment rose from 15 to 24 hours per week, and cash 
earnings rose about PPP $1 a day. Since the average person in the control group 
earned less than $1 a day, the program doubled earnings. As a result, a conservative 
estimate of household consumption rose by almost a third, to roughly PPP $1.25 
per day. Annualized, this impact corresponds to a PPP $465 increase in nondurable 
consumption—about a quarter of the PPP $1,946 standard program cost.
For program participants, the gains were mainly economic. There was little evi-
dence of changes in physical health, mental health, financial autonomy, or domes-
tic violence. Outside the household, however, the program increased self-reported 
social support and community participation. Participants also reported an increase 
in resentment and verbal abuse from some neighbors, however, perhaps due to jeal-
ousy, or because they posed competition for preexisting traders.
The group encouragement, meanwhile, increased the frequency and intensity of 
group activities. We see no impact on consumption after 16 months, but program 
participants who received group encouragement reported double the earnings of 
those that did not. Interestingly, this was not because their petty trading businesses 
were larger, more likely to survive, or more profitable. Rather, the evidence suggests 
that groups spurred informal finance as well as labor-sharing and cooperative cash 
 investment and raise the risk of temptation spending (e.g., Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2004). Among the 
poorest women, moreover, traditional norms could pressure them to share cash, make it easy to expropriate them, 
or hinder their business growth (Field, Jayachandran, and Pande 2010; Duflo 2012). This is the fundamental reason 
that AVSI designed WINGS to include training and supervision. 
7 See Fafchamps (1992), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Murgai et al. (2002). 
8 Feigenberg, Field, and Pande (2013) show that encouraging social interaction via group meetings reduces 
default on individual loans in India. Giné and Karlan (2014) also show individual liability has little impact on 
default in the Philippines. 
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cropping. Group formation also seems to have mitigated the resentment and abuse 
from neighbors.
Ideally, we could have randomly varied all program components and measured 
their returns. This was not possible. But, following the main evaluation, we used 
the entry of the control group into the program to investigate the marginal effect of 
the most expensive component: supervision. The supervisory visits provided sub-
stantive advice as well as pressure to implement the business plan, but were more 
than twice as costly as the grant. When the control group received WINGS after 20 
months, we randomized them individually to receive the business training and grant 
plus: no supervisory visits; two visits (to provide commitment to invest); or five 
visits for both commitment and substantive business advice.
A month after grants, but before any potential visits, expecting a visit had an 
ambiguous effect on business investment: those assigned to supervision increased 
investment by some measures and decreased by others. A year later, the effect of 
supervision on incomes is also ambiguous: nondurable consumption is margin-
ally lower among those assigned to visits, earnings are marginally higher, but nei-
ther effect is statistically significant. Supervision, however, did increase business 
survival.
Altogether, these results come with caveats. First, the control group knew they 
were on the waitlist, and so anticipation of treatment could affect their behavior. 
Second, all measures are self-reported. Experimenter demand is a risk, but given the 
size of impacts (and the absence of noneconomic impacts, where we might expect 
experimenter demand) the bias seems unlikely to drive our results. Third, there is 
mild randomization imbalance and attrition. Treatment effects, however, are robust 
to corrections and to missing data scenarios. Finally, these are 16-month impacts 
and given the fact that the control group entered the program, we cannot say whether 
they persist.
Nonetheless, WINGS illustrates that the poorest may be able to start and sus-
tain small enterprises, even in very small, fairly poor communities. Moreover, the 
16-month consumption impacts of WINGS are almost identical to the one-year or 
 two-year impacts of livestock-based ultrapoor programs, although WINGS was 
about half as costly. So far the livestock programs have longer term evidence in their 
favor, and the sustainability of cash-centric programs to the very poorest is an open 
question.9 Even so, studies of cash transfers to the non-extreme poor show sustained 
or growing impacts after four to six years (Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez 2014; de 
Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2012b).
Cash should be much cheaper and easier to deliver than livestock or capital goods, 
so if it stimulates employment as well as the accumulation of income-generating 
assets it could affect how ultrapoor programs are designed and scaled. This war-
rants more investigation, especially in humanitarian settings where cash is becom-
ing more common as it can be difficult to provide in-kind capital. Also important to 
investigate are cost-effective forms of supervision and training.
9 Livestock programs sustain gains after two to four years, while ultrapoor cash transfer studies have 1 to 2 years 
of evidence so far (e.g., Haushofer and Shapiro 2013; Macours, Premand, and Vakis 2012). 
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Finally, the results support the view that social interactions encourage coopera-
tion, and that such social capital delivers economic returns. Most social capital is 
endogenously formed, and it’s unusual to have experimental variation in local bonds. 
Echoing Feigenberg, Field, and Pande (2013) on microcredit, we see that a program 
that simply encourages group and ROSCA formation can increase social interactions, 
enhance social capital, increase risk-pooling and cooperation, and perhaps even raise 
incomes. What’s striking is that these profitable social bonds did not form in the 
absence of encouragement, and yet were provoked by a relatively short training. It 
implies the poor may be social capital constrained as well as credit constrained, and 
external intervention seems to help overcome barriers to collective action.
I. Setting and Study Participants
Uganda as a whole is a poor but stable and growing country. National income grew 
roughly 6.5 percent per year for the two decades prior to this study (Government of 
Uganda 2007). A long-running, low-level insurgency in northern Uganda, however, 
meant that most of the north was left out.
From 1987 to 2006, small bands of rebels conscripted, abused, and stole from 
civilians in northern Uganda, especially the Kitgum and Gulu districts. Equally dev-
astating was the Ugandan government’s decision to fight the insurgency by forcibly 
moving nearly the entire rural population of Kitgum and Gulu—about two million 
people—into dozens of displacement camps. The camps were often no more than 
a few miles from people’s rural homes, but people generally could not access their 
farmland during the war. Most households lost everything—livestock, homes, sav-
ings, and household durables—as a result.
By 2006 the rebels were mostly defeated or pushed out of the country, and by 
2007 the government permitted displaced people to return home and rebuild. The 
north’s economy began growing quickly, aided by an increase in demand from 
a newly peaceful Sudan. The government started a number of large-scale devel-
opment programs to help the north catch up to the rest of the country. Even so, 
northern Uganda had some of the lowest standards of living in the world. By 2007, 
two-thirds of households were unable to meet basic needs and lived mainly on food 
aid (Government of Uganda 2007).
By 2009, when this study began, most people had rebuilt their homes and had 
begun farming again. Food distribution and other emergency relief had ended. Most 
rural villagers, however, were still desperately impoverished.
A. Study Sites and participants
AVSI identified 120 villages in the two most war-affected districts, Kitgum 
and Gulu. Most villages ranged in size from 350 to 1,000 people, with an average 
 population of 699 (about 100 households). The study villages represented about a 
quarter of the population of the six rural subcounties where AVSI worked.10
10 AVSI actively worked in six subcounties—Odek, Lakwana, and Lalogi in Gulu and Omiya Anyima, 
Namokora, and Orom in Kitgum. These have 252 total villages: 84 in Gulu; 168 in Kitgum. AVSI excluded from 
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AVSI held community meetings to describe the program and asked communities 
to nominate 20 marginalized villagers, asking that three-quarters be women aged 
14 to 30. AVSI staff interviewed all nominees and selected 10 to 17 participants per 
village, excluding relatives of leaders and the least poor.
Table 1 describes the 120 villages and all 1,800 study participants, based on a 
baseline survey of participants and each community leader. Twenty-six percent of 
villages had a weekly market, and while on average there were three shops or kiosks 
selling goods, the median village had none. Most goods were imported from the 
district capital and retailed by a handful of shop owners.
Outside of traditional occupations (e.g., subsistence agriculture and some casual 
labor), main work opportunities came from petty trade and retail, cottage production 
(e.g., bricks, charcoal), livestock rearing, and cash crops. These farm and nonfarm 
microenterprises required few new skills or education, but they were capital-intesive 
and had fixed costs of entry. 
The average participant in the program was female, 27 years old, and had 2.8 years 
of education. Half were married or partnered. They reported an average of 15 hours 
of work a week in the past month, mainly in their own agriculture. Just 3 percent did 
any petty trade or business.
In general they were poor with no access to finance. Average cash earnings in the 
month before the survey were 8,940 Ugandan shillings (UGX) ($4.47 at 2009 mar-
ket exchange rates). Formal insurance was unknown, and almost no formal lenders 
were present in the north at the outset of this study in 2008. Only 9 percent of the 
sample were members of a village savings and loans group. On average they had 
UGX 4,860 ($2.42) in cash savings and a nearly equal amount in debts, usually 
from family and friends. Just 4 percent said they could get a loan of $50, which 
is unsurprising because of high transaction costs and the near absence of informal 
or formal lending institutions. Formal loan terms seldom extended beyond three 
months, moreover, with annual interest rates of 100 to 200 percent. Because of high 
fees, real interest rates on savings were typically negative. Given the startup costs 
of microenterprise, this absence of credit and insurance was a major barrier to entry.
Effects of the War.—The war affected and displaced everyone in the study sam-
ple, impoverishing all. Until about a year before the program, everyone in the vil-
lage had lived in a nearby displacement camp for at least three years, with no access 
to farmland, during which their lands became overgrown and their houses destroyed. 
At the time of the WINGS program, households were reestablishing agriculture for 
the first time since at least 2003.
One in five people in our sample were abducted into the armed group at some 
point, usually only for a few days to carry looted goods. Long stays with the armed 
group were less common, and only 5 percent of the sample became fighters or were 
forced to marry a rebel commander. Abduction and conscription, however, were not 
the sample  villages with fewer than 80 households. AVSI then chose program villages proportional to parish popula-
tion, whereby more populous parishes would have a higher number of program villages (A parish is an administra-
tive unit within the subcountry with five to ten villages). Official population figures did not exist and estimates were 
based on 2008 data from AVSI and the United Nations. We estimate participant households in treatment villages 
were less than 2 percent of households in the subcounty. 
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necessarily a source of relative poverty. Annan et al. (2011) used exogenous vari-
ation in conscription to identify the long-term effects. Social acceptance of former 
 conscripts was high, and most people were psychologically resilient.11 These find-
ings held even for the longest-serving females and those who were forcibly married 
11 Psychological distress is commonplace, but serious symptoms are concentrated in the minority exposed to the 
most violence and with the least social support.
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics and Randomization Balance for Select Covariates
Means, full sample Balance test
Variable Treatment Control 
(Observations = 896) (Observations = 904) Difference p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
demographics
Age 27.02 27.63 −0.62 0.17
Female 0.86 0.86 −0.01 0.72
Married or living with partner 0.46 0.50 −0.05 0.26
Single-headed household 0.51 0.47 0.04 0.17
Highest grade reached at school 2.82 2.75 0.07 0.70
Forcibly recruited into rebel group 0.20 0.25 −0.05 0.03
Carried gun within rebel group 0.03 0.04 −0.01 0.45
Forcibly married within rebel group 0.03 0.03 −0.00 0.63
Lagged outcomes
Any nonfarm self-employment 0.03 0.04 −0.01 0.17
Average work hours per week 14.57 16.19 −1.62 0.12
Agricultural 11.27 13.36 −2.09 0.02
Nonagricultural 3.29 2.83 0.46 0.25
Average hours of chores per week 34.88 34.25 0.63 0.68
No employment hours in past month 0.23 0.18 0.05 0.07
Monthly cash earnings, 000s UGX 8.54 9.32 −0.78 0.26
Durable assets (consumption), z-score −0.67 −0.59 −0.07 0.05
Durable assets (production), z-score −0.53 −0.50 −0.02 0.48
Number of community groups 0.48 0.58 −0.10 0.04
Member of a savings group 0.08 0.11 −0.03 0.07
Total savings, 000s UGX 4.24 5.47 −1.23 0.20
Total debts, 000s UGX 4.24 4.08 0.15 0.82
Activities of daily life, z-score −0.06 −0.04 −0.02 0.75
Symptoms of distress, z-score 0.09 −0.09 0.18 0.02
Quality of family relationships, z-score −0.09 0.09 −0.19 0.00
Any community maltreatment, past year 0.19 0.16 0.03 0.11
Village-level covariates (observations = 120)
Village population 749.62 649.05 100.58 0.34
Inverse distance to all villages 0.51 0.58 −0.07 0.34
Inverse distance to treatment villages 0.56 0.47 0.09 0.43
Distance to capital (km) 46.21 44.72 1.48 0.58
Accessible by bus 0.98 0.91 0.08 0.05
Village has a market 0.18 0.34 −0.16 0.05
Number of shops in village 1.23 1.75 −0.52 0.30
Total NGOs in village 7.13 7.42 −0.29 0.68
p-value from joint significance of 76 covariates < 0.01
notes: All variables denominated in UGX and hours were top-censored at the nintey-ninth percentile to contain out-
liers. The durable asset indexes (z-scores) are calculated so that they have mean zero and unit standard deviation for 
the full sample over all survey waves, and hence the sign is negative at baseline. The differences in columns 3 and 
4 come from OLS regressions of baseline covariates on an indicator for treatment plus a district fixed effect, with 
robust standard errors clustered by village.
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or bore children. Conscription also had little effect on women’s schooling and labor 
market outcomes. Women’s options outside the armed group were not much better 
than inside the armed group, since most would not have been schooled or accumu-
lated capital. Conscripted men, however, were well behind their peers after the war, 
because they missed out on opportunities to accumulate physical and human capital.
In short, the war was so destructive that few young people emerged with any 
assets or schooling. At the time of the WINGS program, they were rebuilding their 
livelihoods from almost nothing.
B. comparison to nonparticipating Villagers
In general, the program successfully targeted the villages’ poorest, but it’s worth 
noting that almost all villagers were very poor by any measure. We do not have data 
on nonparticipants at baseline. Twenty months after the start of the program, how-
ever, we surveyed 2,836 nonparticipant households in treatment and control villages 
(about 25 from each village), and sought to interview two working age adults per 
household, in order to measure spillovers.12 Table 2 reports summary statistics for 
participants and nonparticipants in the control villages only, in order to compare 
people in the absence of direct treatment effects. We distinguish between house-
holds that were and were not traders at baseline.
If we look at similar-aged adults in “nonparticipant” households, participants 
have similar cash earnings, but 24 percent lower consumption, 0.63 standard devi-
ations fewer durable consumption assets (e.g., house quality, furniture, and house-
hold items), and 0.22 standard deviations fewer production assets (e.g., livestock 
or farm tools). Participants also have about half the education and 63 percent of 
 nonparticipants’ work hours. About a third of nonparticipant households have at 
least one adult engaged in trading at baseline, and these tend to be wealthier than 
average.
II. Intervention, Experimental Design, and Data
The WINGS program had four components:
Basic Skills Training.— Participants received five days of business skills training, 
ending with the preparation of a simple business plan. Training was designed for the 
illiterate and focused on business planning, sales, marketing, record-keeping, and 
budgeting (see online Appendix A for the curriculum). Trainers reviewed plans with 
the participants and returned unsatisfactory plans for revision. They encouraged 
participants to consider high cash flow activities that would diversify their income 
sources, especially petty trading and retailing.
12 Shortly before Phase 2 disbursement, we created village household lists, randomly sampled 25 nonparticipant 
households from each village (excluding the roughly 15 participant households), and sought to interview two work-
ing age adults per household on their economic activities, plus household data on assets and expenditures. We also 
collected village prices on a variety of goods. Nonresponse to the survey was only 5.5 percent.
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cash.—Once a plan was approved, the participant received a grant of 300,000 
UGX or $150 at 2009 market exchange rates. The grant was framed as funds to 
implement the business plan. AVSI delivered cash in two equal installments about 
two and six weeks after training.
Supervision.—AVSI trainers traveled four to five times to the villages in the six 
months after the grant to provide one-on-one advising and supervision.
Group Formation.—About two months after grants were disbursed, AVSI also 
offered a three-day group dynamics training that encouraged participants in the vil-
lage to form self-help groups that would exchange ideas for improving their petty 
business and agriculture, organize savings and credit, and (to a lesser extent) col-
laborate or cooperate in activities such as marketing their produce or buying inputs.
The vast majority of the three days focused on providing information and skills 
related to working effectively as a group, including: leader selection, group  decision 
making, communication and listening skills, and conflict resolution methods. It 
applied these skills to the same topics that were the focus of the five-day business 
skills training: business planning, saving, and record-keeping. The difference is 
that the group dynamics training mostly focused on how they could adapt these 
skills when working as a group. The final day focused on how to organize a sav-
ings group, including best practices and record-keeping. Other forms of business 
cooperation, such as joint purchasing and collaborative marketing, were mentioned 
in passing as advantages of working in groups, but these production economies of 
scale received very little attention. Indeed, AVSI deliberately did not encourage 
Table 2—Participants versus Nonparticipants (control villages at phase 1 endline)
Nonparticipants ages 17–40, control villages
Covariate Participants Traders Non-traders All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 28.10 29.35 28.55 28.71
Years of education 2.81 5.58 4.48 4.70
Average weekly work hours 15.02 31.08 21.93 23.78
 Agricultural weekly hours 9.68 21.11 16.80 17.67
 Nonagricultural weekly hours 5.47 9.98 5.13 6.11
Reports any hours in petty business 0.16 0.26 0.07 0.11
Monthly cash earnings, 000s of UGX 15.76 23.45 10.14 12.82
Monthly household consumption, 000s of UGX 108.38 175.05 134.04 142.30
Durable assets (consumption), z-score −0.45 0.64 0.06 0.18
 Metal roof 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01
 Number of goats 0.97 1.62 1.22 1.30
 Number of bicycles 0.39 0.77 0.60 0.63
 Number of mobile phones 0.14 0.58 0.35 0.39
Durable assets (production), z-score −0.21 0.30 −0.07 0.01
Observations 917 360 1,427 1,787
notes: For work hours and income, we report household averages in nonparticipant households, restricting data to 
adults aged 17–40. A household is coded as a trading household if at least one household respondent says he or she 
regularly sold an item a year ago, and did not obtain that item from his or her own production, for any items in a list 
of 35. Individual-level covariates come from a self-reported survey of all respondents. All variables denominated in 
UGX and hours were top-censored at the ninety-nineth percentile to contain outliers.
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participants to form firms or cooperatives. This is one reason AVSI offered the 
group training some weeks after the individual business plans, grants, and initial 
investment decisions.
Groups decided on their own aims and organization, however, and at the end of 
the training AVSI helped groups write a constitution that formalized the aims, lead-
ership, and decision-making structure of the group. Online Appendix A describes 
the curriculum.
On average, WINGS cost $860 per person at market exchange rates: $150 for 
grants; $125 for targeting and disbursement; $124 for business training; $82 for 
group dynamics training; $348 for five supervisory visits; and $31 in other costs. 
This is equivalent to PPP $2,150.
A. phase 1 research design
In Phase 1, we randomized 60 of the 120 villages to receive the WINGS program. 
The other 60 were randomized to a waitlist group (Phase 2) to be treated at least 18 
months later. The participants in the waitlist villages were aware of this treatment 
status.
Within these 60 treatment villages in Phase 1, we randomized 30 to receive the 
group dynamics training and 30 to no group encouragement. Participants in the 
60 control villages were told they would receive the intervention in about 18 to 24 
months, called Phase 2. Figure 1 illustrates the sample, design, and timing.
We randomized by public draw, to ensure village buy-in and transparency.13 The 
draw resulted in a slight imbalance in baseline covariates, reported in Table 1.14 
Treatment participants were slightly worse off, with lower durable assets, employ-
ment, literacy, savings group memberships, participation in armed groups, and fam-
ily and community support. The villages they lived in were also less likely to have 
a market. A test of joint significance of all covariates has a p-value of < 0.001. If 
anything, this may lead us to understate treatment effects. To account for possible 
bias, we will control for these covariates in all treatment effects estimates and show 
robustness to difference-in-differences measures.
To evaluate Phase 1, we attempted to survey all 1,800 participants 20 months 
after baseline, 16 months after the first grant (at the median). Attrition was minimal; 
we tracked migrants to their current location and found 96.3 percent (not including 
three who died). Attrition is generally not significantly correlated with treatment or 
baseline covariates (see online Appendix B).15
13 We gathered village leaders in each district. They drew village names without replacement to be assigned to 
Phase 1 or 2. The authors were present for the draw to ensure its validity. We randomized group dynamics training 
via computer.
14 See online Appendix B for all 76 covariates, as well as balance tests for the group dynamics randomization. In 
total, 24 percent of the (nonindependent) covariates have p < 0.10. In general, the group dynamics randomization 
was balanced.
15 In addition to these survey data, we collected formal qualitative data to better understand program experi-
ences, constraints, and mechanisms. Two Ugandan research assistants interviewed 32 randomly selected partici-
pants in eight villages three times during and after the program. They followed semi-scripted questionnaires and 
recorded, transcribed, and translated all interviews and notes.
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B. phase 2 research design
In Phase 2, participants in the 60 control villages received the WINGS program.16 
We used this as an opportunity to evaluate the marginal impact of the highest-cost 
component, supervision.17 The first supervisory visit or two was mainly to hold 
grantees accountable for implementing their business plan. The later visits were 
primarily to provide advice. Of the 904 people in Phase 2, we randomly assigned 
16 Program changes were minor. AVSI increased grants to 360,000 UGX to account for inflation, and disbursed 
grants in a single tranche for efficiency.
17 Of the 60 villages, 30 were also randomized to have spouses included in the training, and present at the grant 
disbursement, described in a companion paper (Green et al. 2015).
02/09: Selected 120 villages (60 per district) and
communities nominated ~2,300 persons   
04/09–06/09: Baseline survey of 1,800 clients (100%) 
Persons deemed not 
“vulnerable” 
excluded from study 
06/09: 60 villages (896 clients) randomized to
receive training (06/09–08/09), cash (08/09–10/09),
and follow-up (10/09–10/10).    
Performed by implementer (AVSI) 
Performed by researchers 
06/09: 60 villages (904 clients) randomized to
waitlist treatments  
30 villages receive core







300 clients:  
1 to 2 follow-
ups 
286 clients: 
3 to 5 follow-
ups 
01/11: 57 clients no
longer in village replaced  
03/09–04/09: Registered 1,800 clients in 120 villages 
11/10–02/11: Surveyed 861 (96%) of clients (0
deaths, and 0 villages, and 35 people unfound)  
11/10–02/11: Surveyed 870 (96%) of clients (3
deaths, and 0 villages, and 31 people unfound)  
 09/11–10/11: Surveyed 858 (95%) of clients (3
deaths, and 0 villages, and 35 people unfound)  
09/11 to 06/12: Follow-ups performed (94%
adherence rate)  
904 clients (847 original Phase 2 clients and 57
replacements) receive training (03/11–05/11) and
cash grants (08/11–09/11)    
06/12–08/12: Surveyed 868 (96%) of clients (1
death, and 0 villages, and 35 people unfound)  
Figure 1. Description of the Study Sample and Experimental Design
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individuals to receive the cash and basic training with one of three treatments: no 
supervisory visits; one to two supervisory visits, focused principally on commitment 
to invest; or all five supervisory visits, to provide commitment but also substantive 
advice on business management and household bargaining.18
To evaluate impacts, we first surveyed Phase 2 participants about a month after the 
grant, shortly before the first follow-up. We intended this short-run survey to assess 
how participants’ actions and investments varied with expectations of any supervi-
sion. We surveyed them again about a year after the grants to study the impacts of 
actual supervision. Again, attrition was low; we found 95 percent at the one-month 
survey and 96 percent at the one-year survey.
III. Empirical Strategy
We estimate intent-to-treat (ITT) effects via the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression:
(1)  Y ij = θ T j +  δ T d j T +  δ  T – d j A +  X ij β +  ε ij ,
where Y is an outcome for participant i in village j, T is an indicator for treatment 
(e.g., assignment to Phase 1 versus Phase 2), and X is a vector of controls that 
includes a district fixed effect and all baseline covariates, including lagged out-
comes.19 Robust standard errors are clustered by village.
The terms  d j 
T and  d j 
A are weighted measures of distance from the village to other 
treatment villages and all other evaluation villages. We include them to account for 
and estimate potential spillovers from participants in treatment villages to those in 
wait-list villages, which could otherwise bias treatment effects. The average wait-
list village has at least five treatment villages within ten kilometers (km), and many 
villages share markets. We can identify and control for cross-village externalities 
using exogenous variation in the local density of treatment villages generated by the 
randomization, conditional on the density of all evaluation villages in the sample 
(Miguel and Kremer 2004).20
There are two other threats to identification. One is anticipation of treatment. 
If participants delayed investments by one to two years in expectation of a grant, 
this would lead us to overstate treatment effects. Alternatively, the expectation of 
a future grant could act as a form of insurance and increase investment, leading us 
to understate impacts. For instance, Bianchi and Bobba (2013) show that expecta-
tion of conditional cash transfers in Mexico increase microenterprise investment by 
18 We randomized via computer at the individual level, blocking by village. The groups are relatively balanced, 
with balance tests reported in online Appendix B. Before Phase 2 began, 57 of the 904 participants assigned to 
Phase 2 had died or left the village and were no longer eligible. In February 2011, AVSI replaced these participants 
with others from the same village following the same nomination and screening procedures described above.
19 See online Appendix B for all baseline covariates. Also, note that baseline and endline variables denominated 
in UGX or hours can have a long upper tail. Extreme values will be influential in any treatment effect, and we there-
fore top-code them at the nintey-ninth percentile.
20 That is,  d j 
T is a random variable conditional on  d j 
A . Previous papers estimate distance measures as the number 
of villages within a fixed radius. We use a slightly less dichotomous measure, described in Appendix D, using road 
network distances. In practice these spillovers appear to be negligible and so they do not materially change our 
conclusions (online Appendix D).
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relaxing an insurance rather than a liquidity constraint. Our design does not allow us 
to say what these anticipation effects might be.
A second threat is that, since outcomes are self-reported, we will overestimate 
the impact if experimenter demand leads treated subjects to overreport well-being, 
or if the controls underreport outcomes in the (mistaken) belief that they could be 
dropped from eligibility. We feel these biases are unlikely to drive our results for a 
few reasons. Most of all, as we will see below, we observe no impact on variables 
such as empowerment or health, meaning that incentives to misreport would have 
to be confined to economic outcomes alone. Related to this, misreporting would 
have to be highly systematic within economic outcomes: income and employment 
was  collected through more than 100 questions across 25 activities, and assets and 
expenditures were calculated from 150 questions.
IV. Results
A. impacts of the Full intervention
Ninety-five percent of the treated made initial business plans for the buying and 
selling of goods, and the remainder made plans for butchery, livestock, or other busi-
ness.21 As we will see, however, over time their investments diversified into more 
nonfarm businesses and also livestock.
While the capital was seen as crucial to starting their enterprises, most partici-
pants also reported that the training, business planning, and supervision were valu-
able. Sixteen months after the grants, 98 percent said that AVSI staff were important 
in planning their business, 77 percent of people said the supervisory visits made 
them somewhat anxious, and 94 percent would recommend the supervisory visits. 
Yet this advising was not too constricting: 95 percent said they felt free to spend the 
grant as they saw fit.
Table 3 reports impacts 16 months after grants.22 We start by focusing on the 
program without group dynamics training.
At baseline, only 3 percent of the sample reported any nonfarm business, a cat-
egory that includes mainly petty trading and cottage production, but excludes agri-
cultural enterprise and livestock-related work (Table 1). These nonfarm businesses 
grew substantially in the 20 months after the baseline survey. In control villages, 
half of the participants eligible for the program say they attempted to start some 
nonfarm business since baseline, and 39 percent have some form of nonfarm busi-
ness at the endline survey—an increase of 36 percentage points. This investment 
could be an anticipation effect of the future grant (since they will enter Phase 2 a few 
months after the endline, reducing the risk of investments) in which case treatment 
effects understate the effect of the WINGS program. Alternatively, the investment 
and enterprise start-up could reflect the rise in business we would expect as people 
21 Ninety-six percent of people assigned to treatment received the training and grant in Phase 1. The main rea-
sons for not receiving a grant were death or migration, in which case someone outside the study sample received 
the program instead.
22 We focus on occupational choice, employment levels, and incomes. This focus is in line with the model in 
online Appendix C.
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recover from an adverse shock. In principle, the control group could delay some 
investment in anticipation of the grant, though this would mean delaying for nearly 
two years. If so, we overestimate the effect of the WINGS program.
Nonetheless, there are even greater changes in treatment villages. Nearly every 
participant tried to start a nonfarm enterprise, and 79 percent have one at end-
line—a doubling compared to the control group. We see a large shift in occupation 
choice towards nonfarm enterprise, mainly wholesale and retail trade, kiosks, and 
shops, but also including some services.
As a result, nonfarm hours of work in the treatment group double compared 
to controls, rising from about 5 to 11 per week. But there is no crowding out 
of other activities, as the participants were generally underemployed beforehand. 
Table 3—Economic Impacts of WINGS Program and Group Formation








(1) (2) (3) (4)
occupational choice
 Any nonfarm self-employment 0.39 0.401 0.409 0.008
[0.030]*** [0.033]*** [0.034]
 Started enterprise since baseline 0.50 0.487 0.485 −0.002
[0.025]*** [0.025]*** [0.018]
 Average work hours per week 14.98 9.391 9.877 0.486
[1.608]*** [1.794]*** [2.029]
  Agricultural 9.52 3.496 4.002 0.506
[1.389]** [1.300]*** [1.524]
  Nonagricultural 5.342 5.895 5.875 −0.020
[0.893]*** [0.916]*** [1.217]
 Average hours of chores per week 39.75 0.305 1.416 1.111
[1.013] [1.203] [1.301]
income and food security
 Index of income measures, z-score −0.22 0.464 0.616 0.151
[0.068]*** [0.080]*** [0.087]*
  Monthly cash earnings, 000s UGX 15.53 10.372 23.390 13.018
[3.443]*** [4.607]*** [5.512]**
  Durable assets (consumption), z-score 0.12 0.327 0.384 0.056
[0.067]*** [0.068]*** [0.073]
  Monthly nondurable consumption, 000s UGX 107.74 31.031 33.439 2.408
[5.010]*** [5.227]*** [6.049]
 Durable assets (production), z-score −0.02 0.402 0.397 −0.005
[0.064]*** [0.058]*** [0.064]
 Times went hungry, past week 0.19 −0.098 −0.084 0.013
[0.039]** [0.036]** [0.043]
 Usual number of meals per day 1.76 0.057 0.078 0.021
[0.028]** [0.031]** [0.031]
notes: All variables denominated in UGX and hours were top-censored at the nintey-ninth percentile to contain 
outliers. Columns 2 and 3 report the coefficients and standard errors on indicator for assignment to Phase 1 without 
and with the group dynamics component in an OLS regression of each outcome on treatment indicators, a Gulu dis-
trict (strata) fixed effect, and baseline covariates. Column 4 reports the difference between the two treatment groups. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the village level. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Farm hours actually rise compared to controls, from about 9.5 hours per week in 
the control group to about 13 with treatment. Most of this increase comes from 
increased hours caring for livestock, as ownership of cattle, sheep, goats, and pigs 
more than doubles.
We have three measures of income. The first is cash earnings in the past month, 
in 2009 UGX. Cash earnings are noisy, subject to seasonality, and will understate 
income by omitting home production. Thus, we also emphasize two measures of 
permanent income. One is an index of 33 durable assets for consumption pur-
poses (including housing quality, furniture, and household items), standardized to 
have mean zero across all survey rounds, and hence measures asset changes over 
time. This is commonly used as a proxy for consumption (Filmer and Scott 2012). 
Unfortunately, we do not have asset values.
The other measure is estimated total household consumption of 57 goods in the 
past month, including food, small household items, communications, transport, and 
so forth.23 This is a partial list of goods, and may understate true consumption, espe-
cially because we do not have durable asset prices and cannot impute consumption 
of durables. Of course it is possible that the consumption measure overstates the 
value of home-produced items because of quality differences. We also consider a 
family index of all three measures.
The baseline was run at a time of intensive planting and weeding, shortly before 
the lean season began. The Phase 1 endline was run at a time of planting and har-
vesting at the outset of a dry season, during which dry season crops are produced 
and nonfarm activities such as brick-making are common. Major activities include 
the sale of crops and animals for festivals and payment of school tuition fees. We 
see incomes rise from baseline to endline partly because of this seasonality, but also 
because the 20 months from baseline to endline were a time of increasing incomes 
and productivity.
Durable assets in control villages rose 0.75 standard deviations since baseline. 
Their cash earnings rose by two thirds, from UGX 9,320 per month (about $4.70 at 
2009 market exchange rates) to UGX 15,530 ($7.72), while hours of work stayed 
steady. We do not have nondurable consumption data at baseline.
The WINGS program leads to large increases in all three income measures, by 
0.46 standard deviations overall. This includes a 66 percent increase in monthly cash 
earnings relative to the control group, though this is just UGX 10,372 ($5.19) in 
absolute terms. Durable consumption assets rise by 0.33 standard deviations. Non-
durable consumption rises 29 percent relative to the control group, UGX 31,031 per 
month, or about $15.50 at market exchange rates.24 Note this is a total household 
level measure of consumption, and there are 6.9 members in the average household.
This consumption treatment effect is three times the earnings treatment effect, 
which could reflect a number of factors besides measurement error: low  seasonal 
earnings; earnings that are reinvested in other household members’  enterprises or 
23 This abbreviated approach follows Beegle et al. (2012). Some items (such as food) are asked with a three-day 
recall period, some items (such as communications and transport) are asked with a one or two week period, and 
larger nondurable spending (such as festivals, etc.) are asked with a recall of several months. All items are then 
adjusted to monthly totals and added. 
24 We cannot reject equality of treatment effects by gender (not shown). 
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home-produced forms of consumption (e.g., products from livestock); or the con-
sumption of some of the saved grant.
Because no income measure is perfect, this introduces uncertainty into the true 
effect on poverty. But if we use $5.16 per month as a lower bound and $15.50 as an 
upper one (about $13 and $39 in PPP terms) this is indisputably a large impact on 
income in absolute and relative terms.
We also have an index of 19 production-related durables, mainly livestock, farm 
equipment, and vocational tools (e.g., sewing machines). These are not included in 
the consumption durables. These investments rise 0.4 standard deviations, primarily 
from livestock purchases—0.27 more cattle, two more fowl, and two more other 
animals such as goats, sheep, or pigs (online Appendix D). Hence, profits are being 
reinvested in productive assets.
Food security improves slightly as a result of this increase in incomes and enter-
prise. Times going hungry in the past week fall from 0.2 to 0.1, and the number of 
meals per day rises from 1.76 to 1.82. Since the endline was not run in the lean sea-
son, the effects may be muted. The bulk of earnings seems to go into assets, savings, 
and non-food consumption. For instance, savings more than tripled, increasing to 
UGX 107,344 ($54).
Two concerns are bias arising from baseline imbalance and systematic attri-
tion. The results, however, are robust to exclusions of the baseline covariates, a 
 difference-in-differences ITT estimate controlling for other baseline covariates, and 
also relatively extreme attrition bounds (see online Appendix D).
comparison to nonparticipants.—We can also see how WINGS affects the posi-
tion of program participants in the community by comparing them to  nonparticipants 
in control villages. Figure 2 depicts the distribution of the standardized income index 
for participants in treatment villages, participants in control villages (i.e., those 
nominated for the program), and adults from nonparticipant households in the con-
trol villages, divided into households that did and did not engage in petty trading at 
baseline. Comparing distributions, we see that treatment brings the ultrapoor nearly 
past the income levels of nontrading households, but not past the income levels 
of traders. In control villages, means are −0.36 among participants, −0.06 among 
nontrading nonparticipants, and 0.59 among trading  nonparticipants. Participants in 
treatment villages have a mean of 0.02.
The income index is scaled to have zero mean and unit standard deviation across 
all participants and nonparticipants. We restrict the sample to 17 to 40 year olds.
Within-Village Spillovers.—About 10 percent of village households received 
WINGS, meaning WINGS provided a large cash influx into the village. Most par-
ticipants entered petty trading, and so we might wonder about the effect of new 
entrants on prices or preexisting traders in treatment villages (especially given that 
the median village has no shops).25 Comparing treatment and control villages, 
25 If the local retail market is not perfectly competitive (e.g., due to liquidity constraints serving as entry bar-
rier), a program that promotes petty trading should drive down the price of imported goods by increasing compe-
tition. Cunha, De Giorgi, and Jayachandran (2011) find some evidence that imperfect competition partly explains 
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prices of imported and produced/exported goods both fell a slight amount (0.05 and 
0.09 standard deviations, not statistically significant), potentially because increased 
trade decreased the market power of existing traders and brought prices closer to the 
competitive equilibrium. We present these results in detail in online Appendix D5.
We can also compare nonparticipants in treatment villages to nonparticipants in 
control villages (with the caveat that within villages participants were not randomly 
selected). Overall, despite the size of the program, there are limited spillovers to 
markets or nonparticipant households. We see no effect on the incomes or occupa-
tional choice of nonparticipant households, although if we look only at preexisting 
traders we see a slight shift from petty trading to casual and agricultural work, with 
incomes holding more or less steady.
the price effects of transfers in rural Mexico. This would benefit consumers, but potentially decrease the profits of 
existing retail sellers, leading them to shift occupations and potentially lose income. Also, as in Buera, Kaboski, and 
Shin (2012), new entrepreneurs could supply less labor to the market, more labor to their own business, and may 
even demand labor from the market instead. This will push up market wages. Given that most people in northern 
Ugandan villages are not fully employed, most enterprises are owner-operated, and there is a limited market for 
casual labor, we did not expect to see a significant change in wages. At the same time, to the extent that higher 
earnings increases participants’ consumption, it could create a countervailing effect on prices, diminishing any 
decline. Studies of Mexican conditional cash transfer programs find that the transfers increase consumption of 
both cash recipients and program-ineligible households (Hoddinott and Skoufias 2004, Angelucci and De Giorgi 
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Figure 2. Income Index Density, Working-Age Adult Participants and Nonparticipants
notes: The income index is scaled to have zero mean and unit standard deviation across all participants and nonpar-
ticipants. We restrict the sample to 17 to 40 years olds.
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B. impacts of Group Formation
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 report the impacts of receiving the group encourage-
ment. There is no evidence of an impact on business start-up, occupational choice, 
and levels of work. By one measure, though, group formation increased incomes. 
With group formation and training, the earnings treatment effect is more than double 
the size of the WINGS program without the group intervention. Durable assets and 
nondurable consumption, however, are not much higher. Overall, because of the 
earnings impact, the income index is 0.15 standard deviations greater but significant 
only at the 10 percent level.
We thus treat the earnings effect with caution. The magnitude is large enough, 
however, that it’s worth exploring potential reasons. The evidence suggests that 
informal insurance and cooperative activities (especially farming) play a role.
Table 4 reports ITT estimates for various group interactions. Two-thirds of the 
control group are members in a community group of some kind, from water and 
school committees to savings and farming groups. Being in a treatment village with-
out group encouragement increases group membership by 12.9 percentage points, 
and the group formation treatment nearly doubles this effect. The people in group 
formation villages go from being in 1.7 groups to 2.9.
Treatment without group encouragement increases the frequency of meeting with 
a group. People in control villages meet with their “most important group” (not 
necessarily the WINGS-identified group) 1.4 times a month. This rises to about 1.8 
times a month with the standard WINGS program, and to 2.4 times with the group 
dynamics training. Meetings are principally for savings-related activities or commu-
nal farming, and seldom for petty business-related activities.
The group is more likely to save together and lend to one another—in effect 
providing a form of informal insurance. The group dynamics training leads to an 
increase in loans to and from other households, but no significant change in transfers 
(which do not have to be repaid). Total debts rise as a result of group dynamics to 
almost double the control level of debts.
Communal farming is one of the most commonplace forms of economic coop-
eration—people pool their labor and either assist each other on one another’s plots, 
or farm a new plot collectively for cash or own consumption. Control villagers meet 
1.3 times a month for farming, and this rises by almost two-thirds with WINGS and 
group dynamics training. We do not have a measure of total cooperative farming hours, 
but note that with WINGS alone, earnings from the last harvest falls by UGX 33,211 
(about $18) compared to the control group, perhaps because petty trading crowds 
out these activities. But there is no decrease in the group dynamics trained villages.
C. Health, Social relations, and Empowerment
Health.—Table 5 reports non-economic program impacts. There is little change 
in an index of physical health measures.26 But of the three people who died between 
26 It is a standardized index of days ill, a subjective “overall” health question, and three activities of daily living (walk-
ing a distance, carrying a heavy load, and working on a farm). See online Appendix D for component treatment effects. 
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Table 4—Participatory Financial Impacts of Group Formation
ITT estimates, 16 months after grants  











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Group engagement
 Member of any community group 0.668 0.129 0.245 0.116
[0.028]*** [0.026]*** [0.025]***
 Number of community groups 1.721 0.448 1.169 0.720
[0.138]*** [0.155]*** [0.173]***
 Of your “most important” group:
  Times you meet per month 1.409 0.362 0.954 0.592
[0.156]** [0.147]*** [0.175]***
   For communal farming 1.297 0.415 0.843 0.428
[0.327] [0.294]*** [0.375]
   For savings 1.037 0.767 1.555 0.788
[0.196]*** [0.148]*** [0.217]***
   For social support 0.117 0.051 0.201 0.150
[0.032] [0.040]*** [0.043]***
   For business 0.142 0.089 0.142 0.053
[0.104] [0.062]** [0.116]
Financial access and inter-HH transfers
 Transfers to other HH, 000s UGX 8.495 7.269 9.126 1.857
[2.225]*** [1.961]*** [2.802]
 Transfers from other HH, 000s UGX 19.809 44.663 40.858 −3.805
[6.900]*** [7.078]*** [9.641]
 Loans to other HH, 000s UGX 6.317 4.487 10.457 5.970
[1.876]** [1.997]*** [2.450]**
 Loans from other HH, 000s UGX 9.215 1.408 6.578 5.170
[1.634] [2.336]*** [2.511]**
 Member of a savings group 0.272 0.271 0.517 0.246
[0.048]*** [0.038]*** [0.052]***
 Total savings, 000s UGX 37.374 107.607 115.467 7.860
[12.312]*** [12.544]*** [16.934]
 Total debts, 000s UGX 5.232 0.974 4.141 3.167
[1.007] [1.270]*** [1.514]**
other outcomes
 Access to business advice in village, z-score −0.081 0.145 0.213 0.068
[0.062]** [0.064]*** [0.063]
 Earnings in last harvest, 000s UGX 152.768 −33.211 2.204 35.415
[14.844]** [14.022] [16.514]**
note: See notes to Table 3.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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baseline and endline, all were control group members. This translates to a 0.5  percent 
decrease in mortality, significant at the 10 percent level.27
Social and community participation and Status.—Increased income and employ-
ment is associated with greater social support, community participation, but also 
community hostility, according to several index measures.28 We see little change 
in an index of three questions on the quality of family relationships, but we see 
a 0.2 standard deviation increase in seven forms of social support received in the 
past month (such as someone comforting you when you are feeling sad); and a 
27 Also, as shown by Green et al. (forthcoming), there is also no change in mental health, as measured by an 
index of 35 symptoms of depression and distress. 
28 Means and treatment effects for individual components are available in online Appendix D. 
Table 5—Impacts of WINGS on Health, Social Relations, and Empowerment











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Health
 Physical health index, z-score 0.002 0.020 −0.013 −0.033
[0.070] [0.069] [0.085]
 Died since baseline 0.003 −0.005 −0.005 0.000
[0.002]* [0.003]* [0.002]
Social relationships
 Quality of family relationships, z-score 0.018 0.034 0.011 −0.023
[0.057] [0.052] [0.067]
 Social support received, z-score −0.084 0.195 0.159 −0.037
[0.069]*** [0.063]** [0.081]
 Community participation, z-score −0.086 0.159 0.345 0.187
[0.055]*** [0.062]*** [0.070]***
 Community hostility index, z-score −0.070 0.164 −0.018 −0.182
[0.073]** [0.050] [0.076]**
Empowerment
 Autonomy in purchases, z-scorea −0.026 0.082 0.089 0.007
[0.059] [0.062] [0.075]
 Physical and emotional abuse, z-scorea −0.030 0.066 −0.046 −0.113
[0.079] [0.078] [0.088]
 Degree of partner control, z-scorea −0.110 0.170 0.129 −0.041
[0.082]** [0.079] [0.086]
 Partner relationship quality, z-scorea −0.086 0.180 0.201 0.021
[0.085]** [0.111]* [0.119]
 Female and lives with partner at endline 0.536 0.046 0.072 0.026
[0.020]** [0.022]*** [0.024]
notes: See notes to Table 3. Means and ITTs for index components are in online Appendix D.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
a Women with partners at endline only (n = 961).
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0.16 standard deviation increase in five forms of community participation (such as 
speaking out at community meetings or being a community leader).
But program participants (at least those who did not receive the group dynamics 
training) were more likely to report disputes with neighbors or verbal abuse from 
others. Our qualitative interviews, however, suggest they were targets of jealousy 
or resentment from a small number of other households in the village, rather than 
the village at large. Group formation and training may have insulated marginalized 
women from such abuse.
Empowerment.—Finally, we see little evidence that enhanced business activity 
and incomes increased reports of empowerment. We ask all subjects about their 
autonomy in household financial decisions, such as whether they can decide how to 
spend their pocket money, use their earnings to buy clothes without permission, or 
have a say in the purchase of large assets in the household.29 This autonomy mea-
sure increases by 0.08 standard deviations (not statistically significant).30 We also 
asked women with a partner at endline about aspects of their relationship.31 There 
is almost no change in self-reported physical and emotional abuse by the partner.32 
And, if anything, women actually report an increase in the degree of control their 
spouse asserts over their finances and freedoms of movement and association. The 
husband increases tendencies to control contact outside the home and also demands 
or seizes some of the women’s newfound earnings (see online Appendix D). At the 
same time, women report a 0.18 standard deviation increase in the quality of the 
relationship, feeling more free to express their opinions and reporting a healthier 
relationship. Overall, these results paint a picture of husbands who encourage but 
then control their wife’s business earnings, in return for weak increases in purchas-
ing autonomy.
D. impacts of Supervision
In Phase 2, when control villages received the program, we surveyed participants 
about grant use and future expectations a month after they received it (a few weeks 
before the first follow-up visits), and again a year later. Table 6 reports one-month 
treatment effects of expecting any follow-up, and Table 7 reports 12-month treat-
ment effects of two visits (supervision without advice) and five visits (supervision 
with extended advice).
29 We adapted empowerment questions from the Uganda Demographic and Health Survey. 
30 For women alone the result is significant at the 10 percent level. 
31 Treated women were more likely to answer these questions because they were slightly more likely to be mar-
ried at endline, principally because of new marriages rather than any change in divorce rates. This could introduce 
positive or negative selection from “marginal marriages.” We are interested in spousal abuse and relations as an 
outcome, and so the current results including selection are relevant. Alternatively, we could confine our analysis to 
the subset of women reporting partners at baseline. These results are not shown, but in general abuse and marital 
control are lower (though not significantly so) implying the marginal marriages are slightly better quality on aver-
age than baseline ones. 
32 See Green et al. (2015) for a more detailed study of intimate partner violence in this setting. Note, however, 
that abuse is reported by fewer than a quarter of women, and so is probably underreported. Even so, the effect of 
treatment is close to zero and so even significant underreporting is unlikely to affect the basic conclusion, so long 
as it is not significantly correlated with treatment. 
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one-month impacts.—People appear to have believed their treatment assignment: 
only 10 percent of the “no follow-up” group said they expected a visit, whereas 98 
percent of those assigned to any follow-ups did.33 As in Phase 1, participants also 
expressed independence and control over the funds. For instance, 94 percent of the 
no supervision group said they felt free to spend the grant how they wished, and 
80 percent said they could deviate from the business plan. An index of seven such 
measures of autonomy fell by 0.17 standard deviations with supervision. With or 
without  supervision, however, there is little evidence of diversion of the grant or 
social pressure to share it.34
Expecting supervision has a modest impact on investment, at least by some mea-
sures. First, we asked participants to categorize how they spent the grant. Second, 
we sum all investment-related expenses in the last month from an expenditure mod-
ule. Using the grant allocation measure, people have saved or not spent 54 percent 
of the grant and reported almost no spending on celebrations and gifts, whether they 
expected supervision or not. But those expecting a visit increased their share of the 
grant spent on business investment by 5 percentage points, reducing the share spent 
on durables (e.g., homes or livestock).
By the expenditure survey, however, follow-up has little effect on the amount 
reported spent on business items. One reason could be that money is fungible, and 
33 AVSI followed through on this assignment: none of the “no follow-up” people were visited, and 91 percent 
of those assigned to two or five follow-ups reported receiving the correct amount. 
34 We asked participants how much of the grant they had to give to household members and other community 
members. In total this was typically less than 1 percent of the grant, and expecting follow-up had little impact on 
the amount. 
Table 6—Impacts of Expecting Supervision, 1 Month after Grant
ITT estimates, any supervision 
(Observations = 858)Mean, no
supervisionOutcome Coefficient Standard error
(1) (2) (3)
Expects AVSI staff to visit them in future 0.097 0.878 [0.021]***
Autonomy in grant planning and spending, z-score 0.082 −0.170 [0.072]**
Grant money diverted to others, 000s UGX 1.290 0.281 [1.293]
proportion of grant spent on
Business investments and expenditures 0.269 0.050 [0.022]**
Large assets or home improvements 0.119 −0.038 [0.018]**
Food, clothing, or personal items 0.018 −0.007 [0.002]***
Gifts, contributions, or celebrations 0.002 0.000 [0.001]
Health or education 0.035 −0.007 [0.005]
Saved or unspent 0.537 0.002 [0.022]
Expenditure data (000s UGX)
Nondurable consumption 47.821 −0.509 [2.211]
Total business investments since grant 27.481 −1.841 [3.539]
notes: Columns 2 and 3 report the coefficients and standard errors on assignment to either two or five visits from an 
OLS regression of each outcome on this treatment indicator, a stratum fixed effect, and baseline covariates. Standard 
errors are robust and clustered by village.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
VoL. 8 no. 2 57Blattman et al.: microenterprise support For ugandan ultrapoor
while expenditures in the days following the grant might have fallen more heavily 
on durables, the participants may have made up the investment shortfall by spending 
other earned income on the relevant materials for their business.
one-Year impacts.—Table 7 reports the impacts of supervision a year after grants. 
We conducted the survey during a time of wet season planting and the beginning of 
the main harvest, at the closing of a lean season.
Two supervisory visits increase the likelihood someone is operating a business 
by 11 percentage points (19 percent), and hours of nonfarm work per week by 2.3 
hours (44 percent). The three further visits lead to slight, not statistically significant 
increases.
Incomes are 0.021 standard deviations higher as a result of the two visits, and 
0.036 standard deviations higher from five visits. Neither result is statistically 
Table 7—Economic Impacts of Supervision, 12 Months after Grants
Mean, no ITT estimates (Observations = 868)
Outcome supervision 2 visits 5 visits Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
occupational choice
Any nonfarm self-employment 0.58 0.110 0.152 0.042
[0.039]*** [0.044]*** [0.037]
Started enterprise since baseline 0.92 0.045 0.061 0.016
[0.019]** [0.018]*** [0.014]
Average work hours per week 31.49 1.105 4.764 3.659
[2.229] [2.187]** [2.453]
 Agricultural 26.28 −1.168 1.588 2.757
[2.213] [2.168] [2.230]
 Nonagricultural 5.206 2.274 3.176 0.902
[0.907]** [0.892]*** [1.137]
Average hours of chores per week 33.42 1.698 1.797 0.099
[1.718] [1.481] [1.570]
income and food security
Index of income measures, z-score −0.06 0.021 0.036 0.015
[0.082] [0.068] [0.073]
  Monthly cash earnings, 000s UGX 13.06 3.308 2.170 −1.138
[2.523] [2.010] [2.637]
  Durable assets, z-score 0.81 −0.065 0.052 0.117
[0.089] [0.088] [0.082]
  Nondurable consumption, 000s UGX 132.57 −1.008 −3.022 −2.014
[4.968] [5.464] [4.781]
Times went hungry, past week 0.16 −0.019 −0.077 −0.058
[0.043] [0.030]** [0.036]
Usual number of meals per day 1.73 0.029 0.043 0.014
[0.041] [0.038] [0.037]
notes: All variables denominated in UGX and hours were top-coded at the ninety-ninth percentile to contain outli-
ers. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the village level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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 significant.35 Compared to those with no visits, those with two visits have nearly a 
quarter higher cash earnings. Overall, cash earnings are low because of the season. 
This is one reason we focus on measures of permanent income, including dura-
ble assets and nondurable consumption, where we see no significant increase with 
supervision.
We also tested whether supervision has greater impact on the most present-biased 
or least autonomous individuals. We measured future orientation using incentiv-
ized games and self-reported survey questions. We also use a composite measure 
of three self-reported financial autonomy questions. We interact these baseline 
measures with treatment in online Appendix D. The future orientation level and 
interaction have the expected sign (i.e., more investment and earnings) though the 
autonomy measure does not. None are statistically significant, but the coefficients 
on treatment—which represents the effect of treatment on the present-biased and 
less autonomous—are larger and more statistically significant than in Table 7.
E. rate of return on the program
We lack the long term data to do a full cost-effectiveness analysis, but in Table 8 
we imagine the simple case where the increase in income is permanent, and calcu-
late a simple internal rate of return (IRR) given program costs. Our preferred mea-
sure is our estimate of nondurable consumption. We also report IRR calculations for 
the lower earnings treatment effect, although earnings probably understate returns 
because it ignores other household members, non-cash earnings, and the proportion 
of the grant that went into savings or durable assets.
The full WINGS program has an internal rate of return of roughly 24 percent 
using total household nondurable consumption. Since we used an abbreviated con-
sumption measure, this is probably an underestimate of the true effect. This con-
sumption-based return is similar with or without group encouragement, since the 
impact and cost rise more or less proportionally.36 If we use the social discount rate 
of 5 percent commonly used by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the present value of the consumption treatment effect is nearly five times the 
cost of the program.
By way of comparison, the six livestock-based graduation programs evaluated by 
Banerjee et al. (2015) had IRRs ranging from 2 percent to 24 percent two years after 
the program, with an average IRR of 8 percent. Total consumption benefits were 
about 2.3 times as great as total costs of that program. The graduation programs 
have an additional year of data, however, and so we can be more confident in the 
sustainability of its gains.
Finally, despite the fact that supervisory visits represent about half of program 
costs, we cannot reject a negative or zero return. The sign of the IRR for super-
visory visits is ambiguous, however, because the treatment effects of supervision 
35 Given the sample size, we estimated we would require income increases of 0.15 or greater to have 80 percent 
statistical power. 
36 If we use the earnings treatment effects, the IRRs are lower but still large and positive: 8 percent without 
group encouragement and 16 percent with it. 
VoL. 8 no. 2 59Blattman et al.: microenterprise support For ugandan ultrapoor
on earnings and consumption run in different directions, and were in neither case 
statistically significant. The IRR is negative for the preferred consumption measure. 
It’s possible, however, that supervision pays off in the longer term since business 
survival rates are higher.
V. Discussion and Conclusions
These results show that a package of $150 cash ($375 in PPP terms), five days of 
business training, and ongoing supervision led to a doubling of new nonfarm enter-
prises and a significant rise in incomes among extremely poor and conflict-affected 
villagers, most of whom were women who had never operated such an enterprise 
before.
Second, the results show that simply encouraging people to form self-help 
groups—centered around communal savings, lending, and work—was enough to 
boost incomes. By some measures (such as consumption) this benefit was propor-
tional to the cost. By other measures (monthly earnings) the benefit was more than 
proportional. Either way, it suggests that the poorest were not simply constrained 
by a lack of capital, credit, and insurance. Social interactions among the margin-
alized were simple to encourage and this stimulated valuable labor-sharing and 
risk-sharing.
Finally, by some measures, supervising how participants spent the grant strength-
ened their incentives and commitment to invest. We see no evidence that supervi-
sion increased long-run performance, however, since the impact on income by some 
measures (such as consumption) was negative, and by other measures (earnings) 
was positive, but in neither case was it statistically significant after one year. We 
were not able to test the effects of a grant with or without supervision against a 








program costPhase Program Monthly Annualized IRR
panel A. Using aggregate consumption treatment effect
1 Without group training 38.79 465 1,946 24% 9,309 478%
With group training 41.80 502 2,150 23% 10,302 467%
2 Two supervisory visits −1.26 −15 348 −4% −302 −87%








program costPhase Program Monthly Annualized IRR
panel B. Using monthly earnings treatment effect
1 Without group training 12.97 156 1,946 8% 3,112 80%
With group training 29.24 351 2,150 16% 7,017 163%
2 Two supervisory visits 4.14 50 348 14% 992 142%
Five supervisory visits 2.71 33 871 4% 651 37%
notes: The internal rate of return is calculated as the discount rate r at which the net present value (NPV) of 
the program returns are equal to the program cost. Since npV  =   ∑ t=1 ∞   (i T T  ×  12)  ×   (1  −  r) t  =   i T T × 12 ______r , 
irr =  iT T × 12 ________ program cost .
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pure control group in Phase 1 of the study, which is an unfortunate limitation. We 
also only have one-year data on the impacts of supervision. Nonetheless, given that 
supervision costs two to three times as much as the grant itself, the impacts are sur-
prisingly ambiguous.
The returns to streamlining programs such as WINGS are potentially large, possi-
bly allowing more marginalized people to benefit for the same level of aid spending. 
For instance, targeting and disbursement were nearly as costly as the grant itself, 
yet participants were not much different than nonparticipants in the village who 
were not already traders. Moreover, mobile banking technologies are cheaper and 
becoming available in the region. Finally, the last three to five visits cost more than 
the grant itself, but the returns to additional supervision appear to be diminishing at 
best.
Reducing these costs could have high returns. For instance, a hypothetical pro-
gram that delivered similar impacts for half to two-thirds the cost could have a 
35–55 percent internal rate of return.37 It’s impossible to say what would happen to 
program impacts from such cost-cutting, but given the estimates in Table 8 it is dif-
ficult to imagine that impacts would fall proportionally to costs. Given the growing 
amount of cash-based programming in humanitarian and development settings, this 
proposition demands testing.
A. comparisons to other Ultrapoor programs
It’s difficult to compare this program to the alternatives without randomized, 
head-to-head comparisons, but the impacts of WINGS compare favorably to evi-
dence on transfers of livestock and unconditional cash, at least within the timeframe 
we can evaluate with our design.
“Graduated” Ultrapoor programs.—These  provide in-kind capital, such as live-
stock, along with training and other services, such as temporary income support. 
The fact that the WINGS participants invested much of their microenterprise profits 
in livestock suggests that animals are important investments and stores of value. 
Yet the fact that the poorest chose to make these investments on their own, plus the 
relatively high returns to petty business, also suggest that the ultrapoor can make 
forward-looking, profitable investment choices with some basic assistance.
Graduated programs have more and longer-term evidence in their favor than 
cash-based programs, however, with studies showing 10 to 40 percent increases in 
consumption or earnings over two to four years (Banerjee et al. 2011, Bandiera et 
al. 2013, Banerjee et al. 2015). The 16-month impacts of WINGS are comparable to 
the upper end of this range using an abbreviated consumption measure. We cannot 
say if the WINGS impacts persist, but several cash transfer studies with non-extreme 
37 For instance, if targeting and disbursement costs could be limited to 10 percent of the cost of grants (a cost 
reached in the Kenya GiveDirectly experiment, as discussed by Haushofer and Shapiro 2013) and if there were 
merely one to two supervisory visits, the average program cost would be half of the current amount. 
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poor demonstrate steady or increasing four to six year impacts (Blattman, Fiala, and 
Martinez 2014; de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2012b).38
Unconditional cash Transfers.—These lie at the other extreme. This is the 
approach taken by GiveDirectly in Kenya. Results from a randomized control trial 
of grants of one-time transfers of $400 and $1,500 (in PPP terms) show high returns 
to investment in household durables after an average of about seven months, and 
large short-term increases in consumption (Haushofer and Shapiro 2013). It remains 
to be seen if these returns persisted, as there is some indication they decline over the 
seven months.
B. mechanism
Why might WINGS have had such large impacts on income? To generate invest-
ment and high returns, programs such as WINGS must help overcome some con-
straint. Otherwise the ultrapoor in our sample would already be operating at their 
efficient scale, and a cash influx would not be invested in such a way as to generate 
high returns.39 Four of the most common constraints in the literature are: lack of 
credit, imperfect insurance, low business knowledge (or skill) levels, and present 
bias. Most anti-poverty interventions implicitly or explicitly target one or more of 
these.
While all these constraints undoubtedly play a role, the circumstantial evidence 
points to the importance of cash and group encouragement relieving a credit con-
straint. First, credit constraints in northern Uganda were extreme. As we noted in 
Section I, participants’ ability to borrow before the program was almost nonexistent. 
Just 4 percent of our sample said they could get a loan of $50, and those loans were 
short term and typically carried interest rates in excess of the business returns we 
observe. The cash relieved this constraint directly, obviously, but group formation 
also had significant effects on the formation of ROSCAs and the incidence of bor-
rowing. Group formation may also have increased informal insurance (though since 
the main effect of group formation was on inter-household loans rather than trans-
fers, insurance is difficult to separate from increased access to credit).40
38 Note that, like WINGS, none of these cases are truly unconditional cash transfers, as most cash transfers are 
labelled or involve some selection, such as preparation of a business plan. 
39 See online Appendix C for a formal model of occupational choice under various constraints, and a proof of 
the efficient scale argument. 
40 It’s unlikely that a single cash transfer relieved the insurance constraint. Bianchi and Bobba (2013) show that 
knowledge of future cash transfers can increase current entrepreneurship because future transfers insure against 
risky enterprise income. In the program they study, however, households knew they would receive regular transfers 
over several years, whereas in our case people receive a grant only once and in the very near future. Furthermore, 
relieving an insurance constraint is only consistent with high returns to capital if the petty business is significantly 
more risky than traditional occupations. We asked respondents about expected variance in incomes, and found that 
even though treated people expect more volatile incomes in the future, their lowest expected income after the pro-
gram is twice as high as in the control group. We asked people to estimate their highest, median, and lowest incomes 
in the coming year. The difference between highest and lowest expectation increases by two thirds but their lower 
bound doubles (online Appendix Table D2). Qualitatively, our interviews also suggested that subsistence farming 
is perceived to be as or more risky than petty trade, if only because petty trade has higher cash flow and plentiful 
local markets. 
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The success of the group encouragement program component is intriguing. The 
impacts on income are ambiguous, but the effects on behavior are not. It illustrates 
that social capital of various forms was important and may not always form with-
out third-party encouragement. Our design probably understates the importance of 
group encouragement, moreover, since some of the success of the core intervention, 
without formal group encouragement, was surely due in part to the group encour-
agement implicit in the group-based training and other elements of the program 
design. There are close parallels to findings by Feigenberg, Field, and Pande (2013), 
who show that encouraging social interaction via group meetings reduced default on 
individual loans in India. It seems that encouraging group and ROSCA formation 
can increase social interactions, enhance social capital, increase risk-pooling and 
cooperation, and raise incomes.
Finally, the training and follow-up provided business advice and information. 
Most of the people in our sample had little experience in microenterprises in general 
or petty trading in particular. Moreover, the positive effect of two initial supervisory 
visits (by some measures, at least) is consistent with the hypothesis that at least a 
subset of people are time-inconsistent. Thus, skills training and supervision cannot 
be separated from the effects of credit constraints and low social capital. Even so, 
the training and supervision cost four times as much to deliver as the grant, and six 
times as much as the group dynamics training. Also, a review of more than a dozen 
evaluations of business skills training fails to find that it passes a cost benefit test, 
at least on its own (McKenzie and Woodruff 2014). Given the prevalence of train-
ing and supervision components in other programs, and their obvious cost, a clear 
experimental test of their efficacy with cash (or other capital transfers) is important.
C. Generalizability
How generalizable are these results? The post-conflict context in which WINGS 
was implemented could mean that returns to capital are higher than elsewhere: low 
levels of initial competition, scarce capital, and low financial development, all within 
a national economy that is growing as it adjusts to a politically stable equilibrium.41 
On the other hand, we observe similar impacts in nonconflicted regions, whether 
from the graduation program evaluations mentioned above, or microenterprise pro-
grams elsewhere in Uganda.42
In the event that post-conflict arenas do offer higher returns, however, there is 
unfortunately no shortage of refugees, displaced persons, disaster victims, and con-
flict-affected populations. Our results suggest that cash-centric ultrapoor programs 
could reduce extreme poverty in such settings, in addition to the stable contexts 
where they are more familiar. This is useful to know, since with logistical and fund-
ing challenges, the UN and other donors are turning to cash as a main form of 
41 A study in post-tsunami Sri Lanka finds a slow return of firms to pre-disaster capital, that firms receiving 
grants recovered sooner, that returns to capital doubled in damaged areas, and that capital had the largest impacts 
on retail firms (de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2012a). 
42 See Bandiera et al. (2012); Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez (2014). 
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 support for complex emergencies and humanitarian settings, such as cash support to 
the millions of Syrian refugees across the Middle East.
The matter is unsettled. Given the potential scalability and cost-effectiveness of 
cash, and the huge number of extreme poor, what is needed most is a multi-country 
trial, ideally one that evaluates the returns to additional components (such as train-
ing) and pits cash transfers head-to-head with other asset transfer strategies.
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